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WHEN “FREE COFFEE” VIOLATES THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: THE FEDERAL HIGHWAY
BEAUTIFICATION ACT AFTER REED V. TOWN OF
GILBERT
*

Emily Jessup

INTRODUCTION
The
Interstate
Highway
System
contains
approximately 47,000 miles, or 1 percent of all public roads
in the United States.1 Of these interstates, the five most
scenic2 have something in common: natural beauty
unobscured by billboards. Though these highways3 have
managed to avoid the “visual pollution” and “junk mail of
the American highway,”4 there are an estimated 425,000 to
450,000 billboards lining the rest of America's federal aid
highways.5 While the benefits and detriments of billboard
placement along the interstate may be debated,6 they have
been a part of the landscape since the 1800s.7 The earliest
billboards featured hand painted posters,8 while
contemporary mass-produced billboards have the potential to
launch huge marketing campaigns.9 The combination of the
*

J.D. Candidate, Class of 2018, University of North Carolina School of Law; Staff
Member, First Amendment Law Review.
1
Office of Highway Policy Information, Highway Finance Data Collection, U.S. DEP’T
OF TRANSP.: FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN.,
https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/policyinformation/pubs/hf/pl11028/chapter1.cfm (last
modified Nov. 7, 2014).
2
Arthur Weinsten, 5 Great Scenic Interstates in the U.S., LISTOSAUR: TRAVEL (Feb. 22,
2016), https://listosaur.com/travel/5-great-scenic-interstates-in-the-u-s/.
3
Throughout this Note, the terms “highways” and “interstate” will be used
interchangeably, unless otherwise noted.
4
The Truth About Billboards, SCENIC AMERICA, http://www.scenic.org/billboards-asign-control/the-truth-about-billboards (last visited Mar. 31, 2017).
5
HBA: Facts & Figures, SCENIC AMERICA, http://www.scenic.org/billboards-a-signcontrol/highway-beautification-act/117-hba-facts-a-figures (last visited Mar. 31,
2017).
6
Benefits of outdoor advertising include increased advertising campaign performance
and audience reach. Benefits of Outdoor, JCDECAUX,
http://www.continentaloutdoor.com/benefits-of-outdoor (last visited Mar. 31,
2017). Detriments of billboards along the highways include visual pollution and
endangerment of safety. The Truth About Billboards, supra note 5.
7
History of OOH, OUTDOOR ADVERT. ASS’N OF AMERICA,
http://oaaa.org/About/HistoryofOOH.aspx (last visited Mar. 31, 2017) (“The
earliest recorded leasings of billboard occurred in 1867.”).
8
Id. (“The large format American poster (measuring more than 50 square feet)
originated in New York when Jared Bell began printing circus posters 1835.”).
9
See Katie Richards, Chicken With a Beef: The Untold Story of Chick-fil-A’s Cow Campaign:
How the Richards Group Found a Winning Creative Recipe, ADWEEK (June 17, 2016),
http://www.adweek.com/brand-marketing/chicken-beef-untold-story-chick-fil-cow-

74

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

production of the Model T and the standardization of
billboard structures led to a booming increase in billboards
across the country,10 later resulting in the Federal Highway
Beautification Act.11
The Federal Highway Beautification Act (“HBA”),
signed into law in 1965, was intended to follow through on
President Lyndon Johnson's State of the Union address
which proclaimed that “[a] new and substantial effort must
be made to landscape highways to provide places of
relaxation and recreation wherever our roads run.”12 This act
established federal control over billboards along interstate
highways by creating size, spacing, and lighting standards,
reasoning that
the erection and maintenance of outdoor
advertising signs, displays, and devices in areas
adjacent to the Interstate System and the
primary system should be controlled in order
to protect the public investment in such
highways, to promote the safety and
recreational value of public travel, and to
preserve natural beauty.13
While this federal act seems innocuous as just one
section in the Highways Title of the United States Code it,
along with similar acts promulgated by the states (usually
through their Departments of Transportation), bleeds into the
purview of First Amendment jurisprudence. This Note will
argue that prior to Reed v. Town of Gilbert,14 the HBA was likely
an unconstitutional regulation of signs based solely on their
content. This Note will then go on to argue that now, in the
campaign-171834/ (describing how the success of the initial “Eat Mor Chikin”
billboard launched Chick-Fil-A's larger marketing campaign).
10
“With the introduction and wide adoption of Ford’s Model T automobile, more
people were on the road, on highways, and outside of the home. . . . [Businesses] had
[a] relatively captive audience to broadcast messages to with minimal competition”
Cat Chien, Billboard Evolution, 1 FOUR PEAKS REV. 86, 88–89 (2011). “In 1900,
a standardized billboard structure was established in America, and ushered in a
boom in national billboard campaigns. Confident that the same ad would fit
billboards from coast to coast, big advertisers like Palmolive, Kellogg, and Coca-Cola
began mass-producing billboards as part of a national marketing effort. By 1912,
standardized services were available to national advertisers in nearly every major
urban center.” History of OOH, supra note 8.
11
23 U.S.C. § 131 (2012).
12
Lyndon B. Johnson, President of the U.S., Annual Message to the Congress on the
State of the Union (Jan. 4, 1965) (transcript available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=26907).
13
23 U.S.C. § 131(a) (2012).
14
135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
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wake of the Court’s sweeping definition of “content based,”
the HBA almost certainly violates the First Amendment.
This Note proceeds in the following parts: (1) an
overview of First Amendment jurisprudence as it relates to
sign regulation prior to Reed v. Town of Gilbert; (2) a brief
explanation of Reed v. Town of Gilbert and its resulting effects
on the First Amendment (3) a detailed description of the
Highway Beautification Act and its regulations; (4) an
explanation of how the Reed decision has likely rendered the
HBA unconstitutional; (5) a short summary of a recent
challenge to a state HBA in the wake of Reed; and (6)
concluding thoughts.
I. FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF SIGNS AND
BILLBOARDS BEFORE REED
The First Amendment of the Constitution states that
“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech.”15 Though not “speech” in the traditional sense,16
signs and billboards are protected by the First Amendment
as “a well-established medium of communication, used to
convey a broad range of different kinds of messages.”17 The
challenge in regulating this area emerges in the conflict
between the communicative and non-communicative aspects
of signs and billboards:
[a]s with other media, the
government has legitimate interests
in
controlling
the
noncommunicative aspects of the
medium, but the First and
Fourteenth Amendments foreclose
a similar interest in controlling the
communicative aspects. Because
regulation
of
the
noncommunicative aspects of a
medium often impinges to some
degree on the communicative
aspects, it has been necessary for
the courts to reconcile the
government's regulatory interests
15

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See Speech, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/speech (last visited Mar. 31, 2017) (defining speech as “the
communication or expression of thoughts in spoken words”) (emphasis added).
17
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 501 (1981).
16
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Though First Amendment Protection for signs is
presently well established, federal and local governments are
able to work around this challenge by regulating the time,
place,19 and manner of speech, as long as the regulations are
reasonable.20 Prior to Reed, a regulation of speech, and thereby
signs, was permissible if it was narrowly tailored to serve
significant government interests, left open ample alternative
channels for the communication of the same information, and
could be justified without reference to the content of the
speech.21 The content neutrality analysis of the restrictions
was critical in determining whether a governmental
regulation fell within the bounds of the First Amendment.
Before the Reed decision, a regulation w a s usually said to be
content-neutral if it could be “justified without reference to the
content of the regulated speech.”22 Conversely, regulations
were not content-neutral when they prohibited “restrictions not
only on particular viewpoints but also an entire topic.”23
This analysis was and remains crucial because it
determines the level of scrutiny with which courts review
challenged regulations. Regulations that are content- neutral
are reviewed with a lower level of scrutiny such that they
must only advance legitimate or significant government
interests—a wide ranging spectrum which includes public
safety,24 traffic control,25 and even unwanted noise protection.26
Conversely, regulations that are content-based are presumed to

18

Id. at 502 (citations omitted).
“Place” in this context may also be referred to as “forum.” See Boardley v. U.S.
Dep't of Interior, 615 F.3d. 508, 514 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (referring to “traditional public
fora” as “places”).
20
Dimas v. City of Warren, 939 F. Supp. 554, 557 (E.D. Mich. 1996) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
21
Id. (citing Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981)).
22
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 782 (1989).
23
William M. Howard, Annotation, Constitutionality of Restricting Public Speech in
Street, Sidewalk, Park, or Other Public Forum—Manner of Restriction, 71 A.L.R. 6th 471
(2012).
24
See, e.g., McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2535 (2014) (“We have, moreover,
previously recognized the legitimacy of the government's interests in ‘ensuring public
safety and order, promoting the free flow of traffic on streets and sidewalks . . . .’”
(citing Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of W. N.Y., 519 U.S. 357, 376 (1997))).
25
See id.
26
See, e.g., Ward, 491 U.S. at 796 (“[I]t can no longer be doubted that government
‘has a substantial interest in protecting its citizens from unwelcome noise.” (citing
City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 806 (1984)))
(internal alterations omitted).
19
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violate the First Amendment27 and must survive strict
scrutiny. To survive strict scrutiny, the interests advanced by
the government must be compelling, the r e g u l a t i o n must
be narrowly tailored to achieve the compelling interest, and
the content-based regulation must be the least restrictive means
of advancing the compelling interest.28 While the lower level of
scrutiny used for content-neutral regulations is easily met by the
government, the compelling interest standard of strict scrutiny
is a much higher bar.
Another aspect of First Amendment jurisprudence that
relates to the HBA is the slightly different protection granted to
commercial speech. Regulations for commercial speech receive
“different, less rigorous protection” from courts compared to
the protections given to noncommercial speech detailed
above.29 “Signs with commercial messages are a form of
commercial speech,”30 and as a result, billboard and sign
regulation may at times implicate the commercial speech
doctrine,31 which “accords a lesser protection to commercial
speech than to other constitutionally guaranteed expression.”32
The test for the commercial speech examines whether the
speech concerns a lawful activity, and if so, whether the
regulation implements and directly advances a substantial
government interest, and whether the regulation reaches no
further than necessary.33 The test differs from that of
noncommercial regulations in two basic regards: (1) the court
must first determine whether the commercial speech falls within
protected expression, and (2) the presumption of

27

See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502
U.S. 105, 115 (1991) (“A statute is presumptively inconsistent with the First
Amendment if it imposes a financial burden on speakers because of the content of
their speech.”).
28
See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)
(explaining the standard of review for content-based speech restrictions).
29
DANIEL R. MANDELKER ET AL., PLANNING AND CONTROL OF LAND
DEVELOPMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 1051 (9th ed. 2016).
30
Id.
31
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 563–64
(1980).
32
Id. at 563.
33
The Supreme Court has “adopted a four-part test for determining the validity of
government restrictions on commercial speech as distinguished from more fully
protected speech. (1) The First Amendment protects commercial speech only if that
speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading. A restriction on otherwise
protected commercial speech is valid only if it (2) seeks to implement a substantial
governmental interest, (3) directly advances that interest, and (4) reaches no further
than necessary to accomplish the given objective.” Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San
Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507 (1981) (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S.
557, 563–66 (1980)).
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constitutionality is modified to determine whether the
regulation is “not more extensive than necessary.”34
For the First Amendment commercial speech
protections to apply, the speech “must concern a lawful activity
and not be misleading.”35 If the speech meets this criteria, the
test continues on to determine whether the speech is protected
and as a result whether the regulation is permissible.36 If the
speech does not concern a lawful activity and/or is misleading,
the speech is not protected by the First Amendment.37 The
commercial speech doctrine is an important component in
understanding the relationship between the sign and billboard
regulation and the First Amendment and worth this brief
discussion. However, the HBA itself likely falls outside the
bounds of this doctrine and will thus be analyzed later in this
paper under general First Amendment protections of speech.
As described, prior to Reed, the content-neutrality
analysis for regulations on speech looked at whether the
regulation was narrowly tailored to serve significant
government interests, left open ample alternative channels for
the communication of the same information, and could be
justified without reference to the content of the speech.38 This
note now turns to an examination of Reed and the new contentneutrality analysis it established.
II. REED V. TOWN OF GILBERT AND ITS RESULTING EFFECTS ON
THE FIRST AMENDMENT
The Supreme Court's decision in Reed v. Town of
Gilbert39 seemed at first glance to be a simple decision
regarding the constitutionality of a small town's signage
ordinance with little impact on ordinances elsewhere.
However, the Supreme Court, in deciding this case,
“rearticulated the standard for when regulation of speech is
content based,”40 possibly changing the content-neutrality
analysis for all government ordinances.
In Reed, a Church and pastor sought to place
temporary signs around town that announced the location of
their service each week.41 The Town's ordinance prohibited
34

MANDELKER, supra note 30, at 1051.
Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., 447 U.S. at 566 (1980).
36
MANDELKER, supra note 30, at 1051.
37
Id.
38
MANDELKER, supra note 30, at 1053.
39
135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
40
Anthony D. Lauriello, Panhandling Regulation After Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 116
COLUM. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (2016).
41
Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2225.
35
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any outdoor sign display without a permit, but exempted
various categories of signs from this requirement, as long as
those signs complied with certain regulations.42 The church was
frequently stopped from placing its signs around town
because the signs violated the town's restrictions on the size,
duration, and location of temporary directional signs.43 The
Church and pastor challenged the ordinance as a violation of
free speech because the ordinance contained varying
restrictions for signs based on the category of sign.44
Pertinently, the ordinance allowed “Ideological Signs”45 to be
up to 20 square feet in area and to be placed in all “zoning
districts” without time limits, allowed “Political Signs”46 to
be up to 16 square feet on residential property and up to 32
square feet on nonresidential property and displayed up to
60 days before a primary election and up to 15 days
following a general election, and allowed “Temporary
Directional Signs”47 to be six square feet on private property
or on a public right-of-way as long as no more than four signs
were placed on a single property at any time and displayed,
no more than 12 hours before the event and no more than 1
hour afterward.48
The Supreme Court ultimately found the town's
ordinance invalid, concluding it was an unconstitutional
restriction on free speech because it was not “contentneutral” as applied and thus failed a strict scrutiny analysis.49
While the ruling regarding the Town of Gilbert's ordinance
was unanimous, the reasoning was fractured, with several
judges coming to the conclusion differently.50
42

Id.
Id.
44
Id. at 2224–26.
45
“This category includes any sign communicating a message or ideas for
noncommercial purposes that is not a Construction Sign, Directional Sign,
Temporary Directional Sign Relating to a Qualifying Event, Political Sign, Garage
Sale Sign, or a sign owned or required by a governmental agency.” Id. at 2224
(internal quotation marks omitted).
46
“Political signs” are defined as a “temporary sign designed to influence the
outcome of an election called by a public body.” Id.
47
“This includes any 'Temporary Sign' intended to direct pedestrians, motorists, and
other passersby to a ‘qualifying event’. . . . A ‘qualifying event’ is defined as any
'assembly, gathering, activity, or meeting sponsored, arranged, or promoted by a
religious, charitable, community service, educational, or other similar non-profit
organization.’” Id.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 2231–32.
50
The rationales used by the justices to reach the decision were different. Four
opinions were issued: the majority opinion (authored by Justice Thomas and joined
by five others), one concurrence (authored by Justice Alito and joined by two others,
representing three of the six justices in the majority), and two concurrences in the
judgment (one by Justice Kagan, joined by two others, and one by Justice Breyer). See
generally id.
43
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Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas found that
the town's ordinance imposed more stringent restrictions on
temporary directional signs (the type used by the Church)
than were placed on other types of signs.51 Thus, because
“[t]he restrictions in the Sign Code that apply to any given
sign thus depend entirely on the communicative content of
the sign . . . [o]n its face, the Sign Code is a content-based
regulation of speech.”52 Since the ordinance was contentbased, it needed to be justified by compelling government
interests; the majority found that it was not.53
In coming to this decision, the majority reaffirmed the
traditional definition of content-based regulations, stating that
“[g]overnment regulation of speech is content based if a law
applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or
the idea or message expressed.”54 However, the majority
departed from previous standards in setting out a new test, or
order of events, for determining content neutrality that
genuinely changed the analysis. Courts must now consider
first “whether a law is content neutral on its face before turning
to the law's justification or purpose.”55 The majority further
held that, “[a] law that is content based on its face is subject to
strict scrutiny regardless of the government's benign motive,
content-neutral justification, or lack of 'animus toward the
ideas contained' in the regulated speech.”56 This holding
demonstrated a significant departure from the previous
content-neutrality analysis where the intent of the
governmental regulation played a key role in determining
whether an ordinance was content-neutral.57 The two-part test
and content-neutrality standard set forth in the majority is in
conflict with the previous understanding of how government
ordinances are scrutinized after First Amendment challenges.
In his concurrence, Justice Alito claims that “[p]roperly
understood, today's decision will not prevent cities from

51

See id. at 2224.
Id. at 2227.
53
The town offered two interests: (1) preserving the town's aesthetic appeal and (2)
traffic safety. Id. at 2231. The Court held that the interests were not “compelling”
but, even if they were, they still failed as under-inclusive distinctions. Id.
54
Id. at 2227.
55
Id. at 2228.
56
Id.
57
“[T]he United States similarly contends that a sign regulation is content neutral—
even if it expressly draws distinctions based on the sign's communicative content—if
those distinctions can be ‘justified without reference to the content of the regulated
speech.’” Id. (citing Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 20, 24, Reed v. Town
of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015)).
52
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regulating signs in a way that fully protects public safety and
serves legitimate esthetic [sic] objectives.”58
The other concurring Justices, while agreeing with the
majority's conclusion, push back against this change in the
content-neutrality analysis, which they seem to view as
significant. Justice Kagan’s concurrence critiques the broad
sweep of the majority opinion, denouncing “the consequences
of subjecting more laws to strict scrutiny under Justice
Thomas's formalist approach.”59 Justice Kagan states that
“communities will find themselves in an unenviable bind:
They will have to either repeal the exemptions that allow for
helpful signs . . . or else lift their sign restriction,”60 in order to
comply with the First Amendment.
In the alternative, Justice Kagan suggests a contentneutrality analysis that allows the administration of “our
content-regulation doctrine with a dose of common sense, so
as to leave standing laws that in no way implicate its intended
function.”61 Justice Kagan writes that “[t]he Town of Gilbert's
defense of its sign ordinance . . . does not pass strict scrutiny,
or intermediate scrutiny, or even the laugh test.”62 Thus she
finds that the majority did not need to address the level-ofscrutiny question.63
Justice Breyer's concurrence also rejects the black and
white approach taken by the majority writing, “content
discrimination . . . cannot and should not always trigger strict

58

Id. at 2233–34 (Alito, J., concurring). Joining the majority, Justice Alito provides
“words of further explanation.”Id. at 2233 (Alito, J., concurring). Justice Alito offers
a list of sign regulations that he suggests would not be content-based after Reed: rules
regulating the size of signs, rules regulating location, distinguishing between lighted
and unlighted, fixed messages versus messages that change, private versus public
property, on-premises versus off-premises, restricting total number of signs allowed
per mile of roadway, and time restrictions on signs advertising a one-time event. Id.
(Alito, J., concurring). While the purpose of the concurrence is to clarify the ruling, it
may in fact muddle things further. This last category, which Justice Alito claims
would be content-neutral, appears on its face to be content-based because it
distinguishes between events that happen once and those that are reoccurring—
seemingly a message-content distinction. Further, Justice Alito suggests that
distinctions between on- and off-premise signs would be permissible. However, in
order to determine whether a particular sign would comply, the content of the sign
would need to be examined, thus seemingly rendering the sign content-based. See id.
59
Lauriello, supra note 41, at 1132; See also Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2239 (Kagan, J.,
concurring).
60
Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2237 (Kagan, J., concurring).
61
Id. at 2238 (Kagan, J., concurring).
62
Id. at 2239 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“The best the Town could come up with at oral
argument was that directional signs ‘need to be smaller because they need to guide
travelers along a route’. . . .Why exactly a smaller sign better helps travelers get to
where they are going is left a mystery. The absence of any sensible basis for these and
other distinctions dooms the Town's ordinance . . . .”).
63
Id. at 2239 (Kagan, J., concurring).
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scrutiny.”64 Justice Breyer points out that many ordinary
government regulatory activities involve some sort of
regulation of speech, and the categorical approach which the
majority takes does not account for government regulation
that “inevitably involve content discrimination, but where a
strong presumption against constitutionality has no place.”65
Rather, he suggests, the better approach is to use content
discrimination analysis as “a supplement to a more basic
analysis.”66 Justice Breyer proposes to “treat content
discrimination as a strong reason weighing against the
constitutionality of a rule where . . . viewpoint discrimination,
is threatened, but elsewhere treat it as a rule of thumb, finding
it helpful, but not determinative legal tool, in an appropriate
case, to determine the strength of a justification.”67
The majority opinion clearly announced a new contentneutrality analysis that looks first to the face of the regulation
and only later, possibly, to the intent of the regulation.
However, the different approaches to this case muddy the
analysis slightly. One probable result of the Reed decision is
that all government ordinances must not only be facially
content-neutral, but the restrictions must also not have any
unintended discriminatory impact on protected speech, or they
will likely be found unconstitutional.
With this background of First Amendment protections
for signs and billboards pre and post-Reed established, this note
now turns to the Highway Beautification Act to examine its
language and regulations, eventually showing that the Act is
an impermissible content-based regulation.
III. THE HIGHWAY BEAUTIFICATION ACT
The Highway Beautification Act (“HBA”),
promulgated in Title 23, Section 131 of the United States
Code “[i]ncreased the scope of controlling signs to include
the primary system and applied to all States”68 by allowing
only certain kinds of signs “visible from the main traveled
way of the system, and erected with the purpose of their
message being read from such main traveled way.”69
64

Id. at 2234 (Breyer, J., concurring).
Id. at 2234–35 (Breyer, J., concurring).
66
Id. at 2235 (Breyer, J., concurring).
67
Id. (Breyere, J., concurring).
68
Office of Planning, Environment, & Realty, Outdoor Advertising Control: A History
and Overview of the Federal Outdoor Advertising Control Program, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP.:
FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN., https://www.fhwa.dot.gov/real_estate/oac/oacprog.cfm
(last updated June 27, 2017).
69
23 U.S.C. § 131(c) (2012).
65
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The act prohibits all signs within the 660-foot area,
except for those signs which are:
(1) directional and official signs
and notices, which signs and
notices shall include, but not be
limited to, signs and notices
pertaining to natural wonders,
scenic and historical attractions,
which are required or authorized
by law, . . . which standards shall
contain provisions concerning
lighting, size, number, and spacing
of
signs,
and
such
other
requirements
as
may
be
appropriate to implement this
section, (2) signs, displays, and
devices advertising the sale or lease
of property upon which they are
located, (3) signs, displays, and
devices, including those which
may be changed at reasonable
intervals by electronic process or
by remote control, advertising
activities conducted on the
property on which they are located,
(4) signs lawfully in existence on
October 22, 1965, determined by
the State, subject to the approval of
the Secretary, to be landmark
signs, including signs on farm
structures or natural surfaces, or
historic or artistic significance the
preservation of which would be
consistent with the purposes of this
section, and (5) signs, displays, and
devices advertising the distribution
by nonprofit organizations of free
coffee to individuals traveling on
the Interstate System or the
primary system.70

70

Id.
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The definitions and standards for the permitted signs
are found in Standards for Directional Signs, 23 C.F.R § 750.
154 (2017). The HBA defines the kinds of signs that fall
under this regulation as “directional signs” where:
[d]irectional signs means signs
containing directional information
about public places owned or
operated by Federal, State, or local
governments or their agencies;
publicly or privately owned natural
phenomena, historic, cultural,
scientific,
educational,
and
religious sites; and areas of natural
scenic beauty or naturally suited
for outdoor recreation, deemed to
be in the interest of the traveling
public.71
The regulation lays out several standards for the signs,
including a list of prohibited signs,72 the size,73 the lighting,74

71

23 C.F.R. § 750.153(r) (2017).
The following signs are prohibited:
(1) Signs advertising activities are illegal under Federal or State Laws or
regulations in effect at the location of those signs or at the location of those
activities.
(2) Signs located in such a manner as to obscure or otherwise interfere with
the effectiveness of an official traffic sign, signal, or device, or obstruct or
interfere with the driver's view of approaching, merging, or intersecting
traffic.
(3) Signs which are erected or maintained upon trees or painted or drawn
upon rocks or other natural features.
(4) Obsolete signs.
(5) Signs which are structurally unsafe or in disrepair.
(6) Signs which move or have any animated or moving parts.
(7) Signs located in rest areas, parklands or scenic areas.
Id. § 750.154(a).
73
See id. § 750.154(b) (listing the maximum area, height, and length of permitted
signs, and noting that the dimensions include the borders and trim of a sign, but
exclude the supports).
74
See id. § 750.154(c) (providing that signs may be illuminated subject to certain
restrictions and that no sign may be illuminated if the illumination interferes with or
obscures traffic devices).
72
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and spacing of the signs,75 as well as the message content76 and
the selection method and criteria77 for the signs.
The regulation also limits the messages on directional
signs to “the identification of the attraction or activity and
directional information useful to the traveler in locating the
attraction, such as mileage, route numbers, or exit
numbers”78 and also states that “[d]escriptive words or
phrases, and pictorial or photographic representations of the
activity or its environs are prohibited.”79 Further, for privately
owned activities or attractions to qualify as “directional signs”
they must be “natural phenomena; scenic attractions; historic,
educational, cultural, scientific, and religious sites; and
outdoor recreational areas”80 which are “nationally or
regionally known, and of outstanding interest to the traveling
public.”81
The HBA is a mandatory program—states are subject
to a ten-percent cut in their federal highway funding if they are
not in compliance its standards.82 The passage of the HBA
prompted many states to enact their own outdoor advertising
control acts so as to ensure conformity with the federal
statutes.83 Additionally, the HBA authorizes states to establish
standards that are more restrictive84 than those promulgated by
the HBA. Despite the compulsory nature of the Act, the
penalty “has seldom been imposed, and the federal act does
not preempt state and local sign regulations.”85 Though
“billboards along federal highways ha[ve] long presented an

75

See id. § 750.154(d) (requiring the placement of all directional signs to be approved
by the State highway department).
76
See id. § 750.154(e) (“The message on directional signs shall be limited to the
identification of the attraction or activity and directional information useful to the
traveler in locating the attraction, such as mileage, route numbers, or exit numbers.
Descriptive words or phrases, and pictorial or photographic representations of the
activity or its environs are prohibited.”).
77
See id. § 750.154(f) (limiting the kinds of privately owned signs allowed and
identifying that states may prescribe the criteria “to be used in determining whether or
not an activity qualifies for this type of signing”).
78
Id. § 750.154(e).
79
Id.
80
Id. § 750.154(f)(1).
81
Id. § 750.154(f)(2).
82
See 23 U.S.C. § 131(b) (2012) (providing for a ten percent cut in states’ federal
highway funding if they fail to comply).
83
See, e.g., 36 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN, § 2718.104 (2016) (passing the Outdoor
Advertising Control Act of 1971); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 136-126 (2016) (The Outdoor
Advertising Control Act in 1967); GA. CODE ANN. § 32-6-70 (2016) (Control of Signs
and Signals in 1967); COLO. REV. STAT. § 43-1-401 (2016) (Outdoor Advertising Act
in 1981).
84
23 C.F.R. § 750.155 (2017).
85
MANDELKER, supra note 30, at 1050.
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aesthetic problem,”86 many of the challenges to the HBA arise
out of First Amendment free speech protections.
IV. IMPACT OF REED ON THE HIGHWAY
BEAUTIFICATION ACT
Prior to Reed, “many [] courts, construed pre-Reed
precedent as allowing 'content-based regulations [to be
treated] as content-neutral if the regulations are motivated by
a permissible content-neutral purpose,' as long as 'the Act
does not endorse any particular viewpoint.’”87 However, as
previously noted, Reed changed this analysis, stating that “an
innocuous justification cannot transform a facially contentbased law into one that is content neutral. That is why we
have repeatedly considered whether a law is content neutral
on its face before turning to the law's justification or
purpose.”88 Through this statement, the Court has created a
test89 that has the effect of “stiffen[ing] the content-neutrality
rules.”90 As a result, many sign regulations with inoffensive
and harmless purposes, including the Highway Beautification
Act, will no longer survive as content-based and “[t]here is a
possibility that the distinctions between commercial and
noncommercial, and between on-premise and off-premise
signs, are content-based,”91 as well.
A. The Highway Beautification Act is a Content Based Regulation
Similarly to the sign ordinance at issue in Reed, the HBA
restricts “speech” based on content. The act's provisions
prohibit all signs inside the 660-foot buffer except for
86

Id.
Auspro Enters., LP v. Texas Dep't of Transp., 506 S.W.3d 688, 700 (Tex. App.
2016) (quoting Texas Dep't of Transp. v. Barber, 111 S.W.3d 86, 93, 98 (Tex. 2003));
see also Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899, 905 (7th Cir. 2000) (“The Supreme Court
has held that government regulation of expressive activity is content neutral so long
as it is 'justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.’” (citing
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989))).
88
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015).
89
This test suggests explicitly circular reasoning as well—that in order to evaluate
whether a regulation is content-neutral, the court (and presumably municipalities
who seek to regulate) must look beyond the actual content of the ordinance to
consider the possibility that the application of the ordinance might have unintended
discriminatory impact on protected speech. See Gresham v. Peterson, 225 F.3d 899,
905 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
To help apply this somewhat circular definition, the Court instructed that the
principal inquiry is "whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech
because of disagreement with the message it conveys.” Id. (citing Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
90
MANDELKER, supra note 30, at 1052.
91
Id.
87

2018]

WHEN “FREE COFFEE” VIOLATES

87

(1) directional and official signs
and notices . . . pertaining to
natural wonders, scenic and
historical attractions, which are
required or authorized by law, (2)
signs . . . advertising the sale or
lease of property upon which they
are located, (3) signs . . .
advertising activities conducted on
the property on which they are
located, (4) signs . . . determined
by the State, subject to the
approval of the Secretary, to be
landmark signs, including signs on
farm structures or natural surfaces,
or historic or artistic significance,
(5) signs . . . advertising the
distribution
by
nonprofit
organizations of free coffee to
individuals traveling on the
Interstate System or the primary
system.92
These provisions clearly distinguish between different types of
signs, based on their messages. For example, a sign or
billboard advertising the distribution of free coffee by nonprofit
organizations is permitted, while a billboard advertising the
distribution of coffee for sale, even if sold by a non-profit,
would not be allowed. As a result, the HBA is clearly a
content-based regulation since the “nature of the message
defines the sign.”93
Additionally, the HBA's location distinctions are likely
impermissible post-Reed. The HBA distinguishes between signs
based on whether they are on or off-premise signs. On-premise
signs are located on the site of the thing being advertised,
while off-premise signs are not located on the site, but
somewhere else, presumably directing one to that site.
Traditionally this form of differentiation was viewed as a
permissible location regulation. However post-Reed, this
distinction is possibly content-based.94 Generally, a “typical
definition is that an off-premises sign is one with messages not
92

23 U.S.C. § 131(c) (2012).
MANDELKER, supra note 30, at 1062.
94
However, as noted previously, Justice Alito stated in his concurrence that on-/offpremise signs would be considered content-neutral. See supra note 58 and
accompanying text.
93
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related to business or activity on the premises,”95 and the HBA
only allows on-premise signs within the 660-foot buffer.96
Thus, in order for this restriction to be enforced, the content of
the sign must be examined to determine whether the sign
complies with this regulation.
Based on these distinctions—i.e., that only certain signs
are allowed inside of the buffer—the HBA appears facially to be
a content-based regulation. Consequently, as Justice Thomas,
who authored the majority opinion, wrote, “A law that is
content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny regardless of
the government's benign motive.”97 It is quite arguable that the
HBA was passed with, and continues to have, a benign motive
for the regulation, which previously would likely have rendered
the HBA permissible.98 However, after Reed, a finding that the
HBA is content-based requires that it must survive strict
scrutiny, regardless of its motive, which requires that the
regulation advance a compelling government interest, be
narrowly drawn to achieve that end, and be the least restrictive
means to achieve that compelling state interest .99
B. The Highway Beautification Act Does Not Survive Strict Scrutiny
1. Compelling State Interest
The purpose of the HBA and its resulting regulations,
as declared in 23 U.S.C. § 131, is that “[t]he erection and
maintenance of outdoor advertising signs, displays, and
devices in areas adjacent to the Interstate System and the
primary system should be controlled in order to protect the
public investment in such highways, to promote safety and
recreational value of public travel, and to preserve natural
beauty.”100 Thus, the stated interests designed to be furthered
by the regulation are the preservation of natural beauty and the
aesthetics of the highway, the promotion of safe public travel,
and the protection of the public investment. The interests
advanced by the HBA likely suffice as compelling101; even so,
they warrant a brief analysis.
Historically, aesthetics alone were not enough to justify
a government regulation. However, following dictum by
95

MANDELKER, supra note 30, at 1062.
23 U.S.C. § 131(c) (2012).
97
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2228 (2015).
98
The advertising and billboard industry, however, might disagree.
99
Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2230–2231.
100
23 C.F.R. § 750.151(a)(1) (2017).
101
Interests advanced by the government are generally found to be compelling,
especially the type advanced by the HBA. See infra Section VI and accompanying
notes.
96
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Justice Douglas, which found it was “within the power of the
legislature to determine that the community should be
beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean, wellbalanced as well as carefully patrolled,”102 almost all state
courts now accept that aesthetics can be a basis for regulation.
While modern courts are usually willing to uphold regulations
based on the kinds of signs regulated by the HBA, “nonaesthetic factors often help provide the basis for the
decision.”103 For example, in Reed, the Supreme Court
acknowledged that preserving the town's aesthetic appeal,
along with traffic safety, may have qualified as a compelling
interest.104 It may appear “[t]he law has not achieved its
desired result of reducing visual pollution along our nation's
main thoroughfares” and that “visual pollution remains
ubiquitous.”105 However, the mere fact that an interest has not
been accomplished does not necessitate a finding that the
interest is not compelling.106
The promotion of safe travel, its recreational value, and
the protection of the public investment in the highways are each
likely valid as compelling government interests. Public safety is
widely accepted as a compelling government interest107 and thus
the HBA's purpose to promote safe public travel is certainly a
compelling interest.108 Indeed, the Supreme Court has seemed
to agree with, or at least defer to, the belief that billboards are
traffic hazards.109 Similarly, the freedom to travel is a
102

Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
MANDELKER, supra note 30, at 1039.
104
Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2231–32 (2015).
105
Craig J. Albert, Your Ad Goes Here: How the Highway Beautification Act of 1965
Thwarts Highway Beautification, 48 U. KAN. L. REV. 463, 467 (2000).
106
While this may not have been explicitly held, strict scrutiny requires only that the
government regulation “furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored,” and
does not require that the interest ever be fully accomplished by the regulation. See
Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2231.
107
The government’s compelling interest in protecting public safety has been cited and
acknowledged in virtually every area of the law, from panhandling and solicitation
restrictions to gun control regulations. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. City of Lowell, 140
F. Supp. 3d 177, 181 (D. Mass. 2015) (finding that public safety was a compelling
state interest in creating an aggressive panhandling ordinance); State v. Webb, 144
So. 3d 971, 983 (La. 2014) (finding that public safety was a compelling interest in
enhancing the penalty for illegal drug possession where a firearm is present).
108
See MANDELKER, supra note 30, at 1046 (“All courts have accepted a traffic safety
justification.”).
109
See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 508 (1981) (“If the city
has a sufficient basis for believing that billboards are traffic hazards and are
unattractive, then obviously the most direct and perhaps the only effective approach
to solving the problems they create is to prohibit them.”). Prior to the decision in
Metromedia, Inc., other courts had come to similar conclusions. See, e.g., In re Opinion
of the Justices, 169 A.2d 762, 764 (N.H. 1961) (“Signs of all sizes, shapes and colors,
designed expressly to divert the attention of the driver and occupants of motor
vehicles from the highway to objects away from it, may reasonably be found to
103
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fundamental right,110 and thus the government must have some
interest in its recreational value. Conversely, the protection of
public investment in highways may be viewed as an important
interest because is it helpful for public support of infrastructure
improvements, but it does not seem to rise to the same level as
promoting public safety or the value of travel. That factor
notwithstanding, when taken and analyzed together, the several
purposes stated and advanced by the HBA are likely to be
accepted as “compelling” government interests.
2. Narrowly Drawn to Advance the Interest and Least
Restrictive
Assuming the purposes of the HBA meet the
compelling government interest threshold,111 the HBA likely
fails strict scrutiny because it is not narrowly tailored to
achieve the proposed compelling interests, and the regulations
are not the least restrictive means of advancing the interest. A
regulation is narrowly tailored for First Amendment purposes
“if it promotes a significant or substantial government interest
in a manner that would be achieved less effectively if the
regulation did not exist.”112 A regulation does not need to be
the least restrictive means of advancing a government interest
as long as it does not burden more speech than is necessary.113
The HBA's limit on permitted signs within the buffer
area is likely not narrowly tailored to achieve the government
interests. It seems unlikely that travel safety and the
recreational value of public travel are advanced by limiting the
signs allowed to those advertising activities conducted on the
property or pertaining to natural wonders while prohibiting
other kinds of messages on signs. Rather, it would seem a limit
on all signs within this area would more reasonably advance
this interest. Similarly, it is unclear that the limit advances the
public investment in the highways for many of the same
reasons. It is not convincing that the general public would be
more invested in the highway system if billboards were limited
to directional and official notices as opposed to other kinds of
increase the danger of accidents, and their regulation along highways falls clearly
within the police power.”).
110
See Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 177 (Douglas, J., concurring) (1941)
(“The right to move freely from State to State is an incident of national citizenship
protected by the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
against state interference.”).
111
The courts in Reed and Auspro do make this assumption, yet the statutes still fail to
pass a strict scrutiny test. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2222 (2015);
Auspro Enters., LP v. Texas Dep't of Transp., 506 S.W.3d 688, 701 (Tex. App. 2016).
112
1 SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH: A TREATISE ON THE FIRST
AMENDMENT § 8:41.
113
Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989).
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advertised messages. Perhaps, the argument may even be
made that the limitation on allowable signs deters the stated
purpose of the Act, since “public investment [in the highway
system] is important to spur economic productivity,”114 which
may theoretically be advanced by permitting all billboards.
The regulations detailed by the HBA prohibit certain
signs inside the 660-foot corridor, but allow other kinds. These
regulations are not the least restrictive means of advancing the
preservation of natural beauty or the aesthetics of the highway,
the promotion of safe public travel, and the protection of the
public investment in highways. In fact, other portions of the
HBA advance these interests more effectively, perhaps, than
the limit on the kinds of signs and billboards that are allowed.
The standards that the HBA lays out for directional and
official signs, which are permitted, could be applied to all signs
within the corridor with the same result and advancement of
interests. Regulating the size, lighting, and spacing of all signs,
not just those currently permitted, would be less restrictive
than the current prohibition and would probably achieve the
interests with equal success.
The HBA regulations which prohibit certain signs
inside the 660-foot buffer zone are clearly content-based
regulations, and after Reed, must pass strict scrutiny, no matter
how innocuous the reasoning. The interests advanced by the
HBA might be compelling, however the current HBA
regulations prohibiting certain signs are more restrictive than
necessary to advance the stated purposes of the act. Because
the HBA regulations are neither narrowly tailored nor the least
restrictive means of furthering the stated government interests,
the HBA would still not pass strict scrutiny. Since the HBA
cannot pass strict scrutiny and is a facially content-based
regulation, the HBA likely violates the First Amendment and
its protection of speech.
V. A RECENT CHALLENGE TO A STATE HBA POST-REED
Though the Federal HBA likely violates the First
Amendment, states should also take heed since many have
passed similar acts on the state level to ensure they are in
compliance with the federal regulation. In the wake of the Reed
decision, many state and local ordinances on a variety of
topics, including sign regulations, have been challenged as
114

Virginia Postrel, Economic Scene; Highway Spending is Meant to be a Public Investment
in the Nation's Infrastructure That Pays Off for Everyone. Does It?, N.Y. TIMES (May 20,
2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/05/20/business/economic-scene-highwayspending-meant-be-public-investment-nation-s.html.
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content-based restrictions on speech. Several ordinances have
been struck down as content based and have failed strict
scrutiny.115 Many others have probably ceased to be enforced
or have been rewritten to come into compliance with the new
standard.116
In Texas, the state's Highway Beautification Act was
challenged as a violation of the right to free speech.117 There,
the Texas Department of Transportation brought an
enforcement action against a landowner who failed to remove
a sign that violated the Texas Highway Beautification Act.118
The district court found that the Act did not violate the First
Amendment. However, while the case was before the Court of
Appeals, the United States Supreme Court heard arguments in
Reed and the Texas Court of Appeals held off on a decision
until the Supreme Court handed down their decision.119
Following the precedent established by the Supreme Court's
decision, the Texas Court of Appeals found that “[i]n Reed's
wake, our principal issue here is not whether the Texas
Highway Beautification Act's outdoor-advertising regulations
violate the First Amendment, but to what extent.”120
After a summary of the facts and holding in Reed, a
brief explanation of First Amendment jurisprudence, and a
conclusion that “Reed has arguably transformed First
Amendment free-speech jurisprudence,”121 the Texas Court of
115

See, e.g., Cent. Radio Co. v. City of Norfolk, 811 F.3d 625, 628 (4th Cir. 2016)
(“Applying the principles of content neutrality articulated in Reed, we hold that the
sign ordinance challenged in the plaintiffs’ complaint is a content-based regulation
that does not survive strict scrutiny.”); Norton v. City of Springfield, 806 F.3d 411,
412–13 (7th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 1173 (2016) (relying on Reed to
invalidate a city’s anti-panhandling ordinance for the city’s failure to “contend[] that
its ordinance is justified”); see also Jim Doherty, Washington Supreme Court Finds
Begging Ordinance Unconstitutional Under Reed v. Town of Gilbert, MRSC (Jul. 27,
2016), http://mrsc.org/Home/Stay-Informed/MRSC-Insight/July2016/Washington-Supreme-Court-Finds-Local-Begging-Ordin.aspx (“Citing Reed v.
Town of Gilbert, the [Washington Supreme Court] found [the municipal code’s
prohibition against panhandling] to be just that: unconstitutional content-based
restrictions on free speech in a traditional public forum.”).
116
I reached this conclusion based on several conversations with local government
officials and experts in local government and land use. These conversations regarded
potential litigation for local governments with sign ordinances should they enforce
them, and what options they might have to avoid it.
117
Auspro Enters., LP v. Texas Dep't of Transp., 506 S.W.3d 688, 691 (Tex. App.
2016).
118
Id.
119
Id. at 691–92 (“During Auspro's appeal from the district court's final judgment,
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and heard oral argument in Reed,
prompting this Court to grant Auspro's motion to abate this appeal pending the
resolution of Reed. Following the Reed decision and with the benefit of its instruction,
we reinstated this appeal and allowed the parties to submit briefs regarding Reed's
effect on our decision here.”).
120
Id. at 691 (emphasis added).
121
Id.
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Appeals found that “[u]nder Reed's standard for content
neutrality—which simply asks whether the law applies to
particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea or
message expressed—the Texas Act's outdoor-advertising
regulations are clearly content- based.”122 The court found
that the distinctions between permitted and illegal signs
drawn by the Act, which essentially mirror those in the HBA,
“depend entirely on the subject matter of the sign's message”123
and, as a result, “[t]he Texas Act . . . on its face draws
distinctions based on the message a speaker conveys—i.e., is
content based on its face under the Reed analysis”124 and is
therefore subject to strict scrutiny.
In the Court's brief strict scrutiny analysis, it noted that
the Texas' HBA did not further any compelling government
interests, and even if it did, it was not narrowly tailored,
finding the provisions of the act “underinclusive.”125 Though
the Court determined that the Act did not pass strict scrutiny,
rather than declare the entire Act unconstitutional, the Court
engaged in a lengthy discussion as to the appropriate remedy.
Ultimately, the Court decided to strike two subsections of the
Act that included content-based regulations. The Court
concluded its opinion stating:
we note that our opinion here does
not hold that the State lacks the
power to regulate billboards along
Texas highways. Rather, our
opinion holds that under Reed the
Texas Highway Beautification
Act's
outdoor-advertising
regulations
and
related
Department rules are, as written,
unconstitutional “content-based”
regulations (as defined by Reed) of
noncommercial speech because
they do not pass strict-scrutiny
analysis.126

122

Id. at 697–98.
Id. at 698 (“[M]ost of the Act's exemptions depend entirely on the subject matter
of the sign's message: erected solely for and relating to a public election; advertising .
. . a natural wonder or scenic or historic attraction; advertising . . . the sale or lease of
the property on which it is located; and advertising . . . activities conducted on the
property on which it is located.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
124
Id. at 699.
125
Id. at 701.
126
Id. at 707.
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93

94

FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16

The Texas Court of Appeals applied Reed's stringent
content-neutrality analysis and found the distinctions in the Act
were content-based, likely setting the stage for many more
challenges across the country. This challenge to Texas'
Highway Beautification Act should serve as a sort of canary-inthe-coalmine alert to states around the country, as well as for
the federal HBA, as to the vulnerability of these regulations
post-Reed.
VI. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
In conclusion, the Highway Beautification Act is likely
an unconstitutional content-based regulation. In the wake of
the Supreme Court's Reed v. Town of Gilbert decision, signs and
billboards are “speech” protected by the First Amendment,
and as a result are subject only to reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions.127 These restrictions must not regulate in
any way signs based on the communicative nature of the
speech, and those that do are presumptively unconstitutional
and subject to strict scrutiny.128 A regulation can pass strict
scrutiny only when the regulation furthers some compelling
government interest, is narrowly tailored to advance that
interest, and does not restrict more speech than necessary.129
The Supreme Court's decision to invalidate the Town
of Gilbert's sign ordinance has had far-reaching effects, as the
Court's decision has fundamentally changed the contentneutrality analysis as it relates to the First Amendment and
government regulations. The Court's ruling now requires that
all state and local government ordinances and regulations be
content-neutral on their face and disregards the harmless or
even warranted justifications for the ordinances as irrelevant.
Because of the Court's newly articulated analysis, far more
regulations have been struck down as unconstitutional
content-based regulations than were voided in the centuries
before.
The HBA regulations that are based on the message
displayed on the sign are, on their face, content-based
distinctions. Further, the HBA limits the kinds of signs which
are allowed within 660 feet of federal public highways to those
which are directional signs pertaining to natural wonders or
attractions, those advertising the sale or lease of the property
where they are located, those advertising activities taking place
127

See supra Section I.
Id.
129
Id.
128
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on the property where the sign is located, those which qualify
as landmark signs, and, funnily, signs advertising the
distribution of free coffee by non-profit organizations.130 As a
result, for the HBA to be constitutional, it would have to pass
strict scrutiny, which it likely will not. The stated purposes of
the HBA may be compelling government interests. However
even working under the assumption that they are, the HBA
does not pass the rest of the strict scrutiny test because the
regulations are not narrowly tailored to further those interests,
and they are not the least restrictive regulations available to
advance those interests.
Further
evidence
of
the
HBA's
likely
unconstitutionality is apparent by the recent Texas Court of
Appeals case that struck down portions of the Texas Act. The
Texas Act, which included language virtually identical to that
in the federal HBA, was found by the Court to be a contentbased regulation that did not survive strict scrutiny. Though
that case likely has relatively minimal implications for the
federal HBA, it is noteworthy in that the statute’s language has
virtually already come under fire and failed to pass
constitutional muster.
While the elimination of the content-based language in
the Texas Highway Beautification Act points to the
unconstitutionality of the federal Act, it is unlikely that a
challenge will be brought against the federal HBA in the near
future. Several factors likely contribute to a disinclination to
challenge the Act, now on the books for over 50 years. Perhaps
the most powerful reason is the existence of state acts. As
mentioned above, in the wake of the passage of the federal
HBA, virtually every state passed a similar, if not identical,
statute which enabled them to maintain “effective control”131
over their outdoor displays along the federal highway
systems and thereby not lose 10 percent of their federal
highway funds.132 As a result, it is likely that state acts, not the
federal Act, will be the first target of First Amendment
challenges going forward. In addition, it is the states that are
charged with the enforcement of the HBA, further suggesting it
will be state Acts that will first come under attack.
130

23 U.S.C. § 131 (2012).
Id. § 131(c).
132
Id. § 131(b) (“Federal-aid highway funds apportioned . . . to any State which the
Secretary determines has not made provision for effective control of the erection and
maintenance along the Interstate System and the primary system of those additional
outdoor advertising signs, displays, and devices . . . shall be reduced by amounts
equal to 10 per centum of the amounts which would otherwise be apportioned to
such State under section 104 of this title, until such time as such State shall provide
for such effective control.”).
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Should the federal HBA come under fire, the
government may be hard-pressed to find ways to strike the
offending provisions and avoid a total voiding of the Act. The
Texas Court of Appeals, in striking down the Texas HBA,
contemplated this dilemma:
[t]o resolve the Act's constitutional
problems, all of the content-based
provisions must be severed. . . .
Would this leave standing a law—
i.e., the Legislature's ban on
outdoor
advertising—that
is
“complete in itself”? Perhaps. But
what is not so easily answered in
the affirmative is the second prong
of the severability question: Is the
remaining law capable of being
executed in accordance with the
apparent legislative intent, wholly
independent of that which was
rejected?133
The Court's questions about whether severing the
unconstitutional aspects of the Texas Act render the Act as a
whole superfluous are applicable to the federal HBA as well.
In fact, virtually the very nature of the federal HBA is to
permit some signs and not others along the federal highways, a
job that would be impossible to do if those distinctions were
severed from the rest of the Act. Because the Act could not
easily be maintained without the potentially
severable
portions, it is likely the Court would strike the entire HBA
rather than attempt to rework it. As the Texas court stated, “it
is for the Legislature, not this Court, to clarify its intent
regarding the Texas Highway Beautification Act in the wake
of Reed.”134
All things considered, the Highway Beautification Act,
noble in its efforts to enhance the scenic nature of the highway
system, is likely an unconstitutional restraint on speech in
violation of the First Amendment in light of the Reed contentneutrality analysis. While it is doubtful the federal HBA will
come under fire in the near future, should it be challenged, the
federal government must be prepared to make changes to the
133

Auspro Enters., LP v. Texas Dep't of Transp., 506 S.W.3d at 704–5 (Tex. App.
2016) (internal quotation marks omitted).
134
Id. at 707.
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statute or perhaps have several of the provisions struck
completely.
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